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INTRODUCTION
The amendments made to the Companies Act 61 of 1973 (hereafter referred
to as ‘the Act’) by the Companies Amendment Act 37 of 1999 made
far-reaching changes affecting the share capital of a company. A significant
change was the removal of ss 83–90 of the Act, which required a special
resolution and, except in limited circumstances, a court’s sanction in order
for a company to reduce its share capital.
The removal of the reduction provisions in ss 83–90 raises the question
whether the reductions of share capital that were permitted in terms of these
provisions are still permissible and, if so, subject to what requirements, if any.
The old reduction provisions permitted a reduction in any way (other than by
paying off capital in instalments or future payments), including the cancellation
(write-off) of any paid-up share capital which had been lost or was not
represented by available assets, and the paying off of any paid-up share capital
which was in excess of the wants of the company (ss 83(1) and 84(1)).
In the old reduction provisions (ss 83–90) a reduction of share capital
referred to a reduction of ‘paid-up capital’ (see ss 84 and 85(1)). However,
the fact that the reduction provisions referred, inter alia, to paid-up share
capital which had been ‘lost or was not represented by available assets’
suggests that what was meant was not the amount of capital actually received
by the company from the shareholders as the purchase price of the shares
issued to them, but the share capital and stated capital accounts reflecting the
company’s issued share capital. The reduction provisions were made
applicable to the share premium account and the capital redemption reserve
fund by s 76(1) and s 98(1)(b) respectively.
The question addressed in this note is accordingly whether a company can
reduce its share capital account, stated capital account, share premium
account and capital redemption reserve fund, whether it be by way of a
payment to shareholders or simply by way of a write-off. The question relates
to reductions generally, cognizance being taken of the fact that the Act
clearly permits reductions where a ‘buy-back’ takes place (see ss 85(5) and
85(6)) and in other specified circumstances (see ss 76(3), 77(3), and 252(3)).
It is submitted that the answer to this question is that the following
considerations indicate that a company does not have the power generally to
reduce capital.
CONSIDERATIONS INDICATING THAT THERE IS NO
GENERAL POWER TO REDUCE SHARE CAPITAL
Shareholders and not only creditors need protection
It is true that if, as the law now stands, companies are free to reduce their
share capital, creditors are afforded some protection. Where the reduction
THE SOUTH AFRICAN LAW JOURNAL294
involves a payment to shareholders creditors are protected because s 90 must
be complied with, which requires compliance with the prescribed ‘solvency’
and ‘liquidity’ requirements (see s 90(2)(a) and (b)). And where the reduction
does not involve a payment to shareholders, creditors require no protection
because they are not affected at all. All this is true, but sight must not be lost
of the fact that a reduction, whether it involves a payment to shareholders or
not, always involves a variation of the rights of the shareholders. This is most
dramatically the case where shares are cancelled. It is also the case where the
par value of shares is reduced or, in the case of no par value shares, where the
stated capital account is reduced. That is to say, a reduction of share capital
always involves either the abrogation of the rights of certain shareholders
(cancellation) or the variation (a diminution) of rights of the shareholders on
winding-up. (This explains why, prior to the 1999 amendments, a company
that had lost any or all of its paid-up capital was not, and could not sensibly
be, required to reduce its capital.) Consequently, when asked to confirm a
reduction under the old provisions, the courts always ensured, not only that
the company’s creditors were protected, but also that the reduction was fair
as between the shareholders. As Galgut J put it in Ex parte Vlakfontein Gold
Mining Co Ltd 1970 (2) SA 180 (T) at 183, one of the duties of the court
when asked to confirm a reduction of capital was ‘to consider whether the
proposed reduction is fair and equitable as between the shareholders and
particularly as between different classes of shareholders’. (See M S Blackman
RD Jooste G K Everingham Commentary on the Companies Act vol 1 at 5–13.)
It is submitted that the fact that the Act now provides no protection for
shareholders (they were protected under the old ss 83–90) indicates that a
reduction is prohibited. Surely it could not have been the intention of the
legislature to disregard the rights of shareholders?
As far as the share premium account is concerned, prior to the
introduction of a provision governing the share premium account (in
England in 1948, in SouthAfrica in 1952), share premium constituted part of
the distributable surplus, which the company, if it so wished, could distribute
to its shareholders by way of dividend. The reason why a provision was
introduced equating the share premium with share capital as far as reductions
were concerned was given by Walton J in Shearer (Inspector of Taxes) v Bercain
Ltd [1980] 3 All ER 295 at 300–301, namely, that the purpose of the
provision was to protect shareholders who had paid a premium for their
shares: to ensure that the premiums they had paid were not paid away in
dividends to other shareholders. Although this reasoning, it is submitted, is
fallacious, at least where the shares are standing at a premium in the market
(see Blackman et al op cit 5–21), if it is accepted that the reasoning is valid, it
will be recognized that if a company is now free to reduce its share premium
this need for protection will not be provided for. Surely, again, this could not
have been the intention of the legislature, indicating that the reduction of the
share premium account is not permitted.
NOTES 295
Section 90 is not a reduction provision
Section 90 of the Act does not expressly or impliedly permit a reduction of
capital. As has been stated:
‘Section 90 puts an end to the capital maintenance rule. A company may now distribute (make
‘payments’ of) all its net assets to its shareholders. The section draws no distinction between distributions
of profits and distributions out of capital; and all such ‘payments’, regardless of whether or not they
involve payment out of capital, leave the company’s share capital and its capital accounts unaffected.
Thus, s 90 puts an end to the rule that ‘dividends’, in the sense of any payment or benefit given by a
company to its shareholders qua shareholders, cannot be paid out of capital. It permits ‘payments’ out of
capital without a reduction of the company’s share capital (and, of course, without the consent of the
company’s creditors and the confirmation of the court). Hence, what it permits is not the reduction of
share capital, but, rather, the payment of capital funds to shareholders without a reduction of share capital. It
should be noted that a reduction of share capital coupled with a distribution of capital funds constituted
a return of capital funds to the shareholders concerned. Strictly speaking, s 90 does not authorize a return
of capital funds. The shareholders’ rights to return of their capital on winding-up remain intact. What
s 90 permits the company to do is to make payments to the shareholders out of capital funds.’ (Blackman
et al op cit 5–112.)
A company’s powers are statutory
A company is a creature of statute and as such has only such powers as are
expressly or impliedly conferred upon it by the Companies Act. As Lord
Halsbury said in Ooregum Gold Mining Co of India v Roper [1892] AC 125
(HL) at 133: ‘[T]he whole structure of a limited company owes its existence
to the Act of Parliament, and it is to the Act of Parliament one must refer to
see what are its powers, and within what limits it is free to act.’
A company, accordingly, derives no powers from the common law and
any power it has must be provided for the by the Act. With the removal of
the old reduction provisions and no enactment of new reduction provisions
it follows that the power does not exist.
It is true that art 31(g) of Table A and art 30(g) of Table B still provide that
the company may by special resolution ‘reduce its share capital, stated capital,
any capital redemption reserve fund or any share premium account, in any
manner and with, and subject to, any incident authorized, and consent
required by the law’. The purpose of this article was to provide the necessary
authorization required by the Act for the exercise of the power to reduce
share capital in terms of the old ss 83 and 84 — both these provisions
empowered the company to reduce its share capital ‘if so authorized by its
articles’. An authorization in terms of the articles to reduce its share capital
cannot confer on a company a power to do so that is not conferred by the
Act.
Regarding the statutory nature of a company’s power to reduce its capital
it is to be noted that our Companies Act’s origins can be traced back to the
1862 English Companies Act, which, as enacted, made no provision for the
reduction of share capital. In 1867 the Act was amended (Companies Act
1867, 30 and 31 Vict c 131) to empower a company to reduce its share
capital (a special resolution and court confirmation were required) and our
legislature later followed suit. As Lord Herschell explained in relation to that
amendment: ‘Experience appears to have shown that circumstances might
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occur in which a reduction of the capital would be expedient. Accordingly,
by the Companies Act, 1867, provision was made enabling a company under
strictly defined conditions to reduce its capital.’ (Trevor v Whitworth (1887) 12
App Cas 409 at 415–416; [1886–90] All ER Rep 46 at 50 (HL).) He said
also: ‘Nothing can be stronger than these carefully-worded provisions
[governing reduction of share capital] to show how inconsistent with the
very constitution of a joint-stock company, with limited liability, the right to
reduce its capital was considered to be’ ((1887) 12 App Cas 409 at 416;
[1886–90] All ER Rep 46 at 50 (HL)). It follows that by removing the
reduction provisions the legislature has reverted to the original position.
Why are other alterations specifically dealt with?
Section 75 of the Act empowers a company, subject to certain requirements
(including a special resolution), to make various alterations (not reductions)
to its share capital and shares, eg increasing share capital and cancelling
authorized but unissued shares. If a reduction of share capital is permitted and
as there is nothing in the Act prescribing any special requirements to achieve
it, it means that a reduction can be achieved far more easily than ‘harmless’
alterations, eg the cancellation of authorized but unissued shares. This is
illogical.
Amendments to ss 76(1) and 98(1)(b)
Prior to an amendment in 2001 (see s 9 of the Companies Amendment Act
35 of 2001) s 76(1) provided that ‘the provisions of the Act relating to the
reduction of the share capital of a company shall, except as provided in this
section, apply as if the share premium account were paid-up share capital of
the company’. When the provisions of the Act relating to reduction of share
capital (ss 83–90), which were the provisions referred to, were removed by
the 1999 amendment, the legislature, through an oversight, failed to amend
s 76(1) accordingly. The position was rectified to an extent by the
amendment in 2001 referred to above. Section 76(1) now provides that ‘the
provisions of this Act relating to the share capital of a company shall, except
as provided in this section, apply as if the share premium account were
paid-up share capital of the company’. The reference to any reduction
provisions in the Act has thus been removed, the logical implication being
that there are no longer any provisions enabling a company to reduce its
share capital. (It is not clear what the meaning is of the new wording. What
are the provisions of the Act relating to share capital that now apply to the
share premium account?)
There was a similar oversight relating to the capital reserve fund provided
for by s 98(1)(b) of the Act. Section 98(1)(b), prior to its amendment in 2001,
contained the same wording, quoted above, that was contained in s 76(1) of
the Act. Section 98(1)(b) too, through an oversight, was not amended in
1999 and, as in the case of s 76(1), removal of the reference to the old
reduction provisions only came about in 2001 (see s 12 of the Companies
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Amendment Act 35 of 2001). The 2001 amendment has the same logical
implication as the amendment to s 76(1), namely, that the Act no longer
contains provisions which empower a company to reduce its share capital.
Reductions using s 56(4)
Section 52(2) provides that the memorandum of a company with a share
capital shall state ‘the amount of the share capital with which it is proposed to
be registered and the division thereof into shares of a fixed amount’
(s 52(2)(a)(i)) and ‘the number of shares if the company is to have shares of no
par value’ (s 52(2)(a)(ii)). These provisions accordingly provide for the
so-called ‘authorised share capital’ of the company.
Any changes to the authorized share capital in the memorandum require a
special resolution (s 56(4)).
Could it be argued that herein lies the machinery enabling a company to
reduce its issued share capital? If a reduction of issued share capital does not
involve a reduction of authorized share capital no alteration of the company’s
memorandum is necessary, in fact no reduction is possible. If, however, the
reduction does involve a reduction of authorized share capital, does this
mean that the reduction can be achieved by a special resolution in terms of
s 56(4)? Thus if a company wishes to cancel issued shares or to reduce the par
value of issued shares, can this be achieved through an alteration to the
memorandum by special resolution in terms of s 56(4)?
This argument is questionable in a number of respects. First, it does not
cater for all reductions. For example, it does not provide the means whereby
a company can reduce its stated capital without a reduction in the number of
no par value shares. Secondly, it is illogical in that it only permits a company
to reduce its share capital if it is prepared to go the extra step of amending its
memorandum. For example, it can only cancel issued shares if it also reduces
the number of authorized shares. Thirdly, if the legislature wished to replace
a means of reduction of share capital which has previously been specifically
and comprehensively provided for, surely it would not do so in such an
obscure and incomplete way. Why expressly single out less innocuous
alterations of share capital, as has been done in s 75, and leave an important
alteration such as a reduction (which can seriously impact on shareholders’
rights) to be dealt with in such an obfuscated way?
Why the need for the specific reduction provisions?
With regard to the reduction of the share premium account, it is noteworthy
that s 76(3) specifically permits this account to be ‘applied’ (a reduction is
clearly implied) for various purposes. If reductions of the share premium
account were generally permitted, there would be no need for s 76(3). The
fact that s 76(3)(d) (which permits the use of its share premium by a company
to pay a premium on the acquisition of its shares in accordance with s 85 of
the Act) was inserted by the same 1999 Amendment Act that abolished the
old ss 83–90 reduction provisions enhances this argument. This addition to
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s 76(3) also counters any argument that s 76(3) should have been abolished
and its continued presence is as a result of an oversight by the legislature.
Regarding oversights, it is to be noted that there are still provisions in the
Act which continue to refer to reductions of capital. Section 75(2) provides
that a cancellation of authorized but unissued shares ‘shall not be deemed to
be a reduction of capital within the meaning of the Act’ (a ‘reduction of
capital’ is nowhere defined in the Act). Section 194(1)(b) provides that
preference shareholders whose right to vote has been removed by the articles
shall nevertheless have the right to vote ‘in regard to any resolution proposed
which directly affects any of the rights attached to such shares or the interests
of the holders thereof, including a resolution . . . for the reduction of its
capital’.
It is submitted that, based on the arguments set out above, a reduction of
capital is not permitted, and the continued existence of these provisions is
due to an oversight on the part of the legislature.
Although it is a cardinal rule of interpretation of statutes that a statute
should not be interpreted as to render certain provisions redundant (see
Minister of Law and Order v Argus Printing and Publishing Co Ltd 1990 (1) SA
1058 (A) at 1067 B–C), there is authority that a court may find that the
legislature failed to repeal provisions through oversight (see Fundstrust (Pty)
Ltd (In Liquidation) v Van Deventer 1997 (1) SA 710 (A) at 733G; R v Correia
1958 (1) SA 533 (A) at 538B). In Correia’s case Fagan CJ accepted that the
interpretation of a statutory provision that he favoured rendered it
ineffective, because there was never a case to which it could apply. Earlier in
his judgment he said: ‘even Parliament may have nodded’ (Correia (supra) ??).
Also in the Fundstrust case Hefer JA remarked: ‘[W]e must bear in mind that
faithful avoidance of anomalies is not the lawgiver’s forte’ ((supra) ??).
CONCLUSION
The Memorandum on the Objects of the Companies Amendment Bill, 1994
(B17D–99) states:
‘The principles of capital maintenance have undergone significant changes in almost all countries. The
modern notion of capital maintenance is that companies may reduce capital, including the acquisition of
their own shares, but subject to solvency and liquidity criteria. This has the advantage of affording
protection to creditors whilst at the same time giving flexibility to companies to achieve sound
commercial objectives. These aspects of flexibility and achievement of sound commercial objectives
have become extremely important since South Africa’s re-entry into the global markets.’
This statement does, it is conceded, indicate an intention to permit
reductions of capital and a desire to allow for far greater flexibility in the
regulation of what a company can do with its shares and share capital. And
this is borne out by the 1999 amendments, which, inter alia, abolished the
capital maintenance rule by lifting the prohibition on the acquisition by a
company of its own shares (s 85) and the payment of dividends out of share
capital.
Despite the new approach reflected in the Explanatory Memorandum and
evidenced by the 1999 amendments, it is submitted that the intention to
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permit reductions is not borne out by the wording of theAct, and for a court
to conclude that it is possible would constitute unacceptable judicial
law-making. It is contended that the considerations set out in this note
clearly indicate that our company law does not permit a company, other than
in the specific instances provided for, to reduce its share capital. There is
undeniably a need for a general enabling provision, but this requires
legislative intervention, intervention that takes into account that it is not
only creditors who need protection but shareholders as well.
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